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Public Speech as a Knowledge Aggregate – Possibilities of Research

„Look narrowly! Do not think, but look!
(...) We want to understand something that is already open to our eyes”¹.

ABSTRAKT

Wystąpienie publiczne jako agregacja wiedzy – propozycje badań

Artykuł analizuje wystąpienie publiczne jako agregat lub jednostkę wiedzy i bada możliwości eksploracji mowy publicznej jako produktu medialnego. Wykorzystując metodologię teoretyków tzw. „przełomu językowego” (L. Wittgensteina, R. Barthes’a, J. Derridy, J. Kristevey) i badaczy problemów socjologii wiedzy (P. Bergera, T. Luckmanna, K. Knorr-Cetina, M. Foucaulta, E. Goffmana) autor dowodzi, że reprezentacja medialna struktur wiedzy w mowie publicznej jest faktem rzeczywistym i faktem społecznym, a wytworzone w jej ramach agregaty wiedzy mają swoją strukturalną i praktyczną specyfikę. W artykule przedstawiono analizę tekstów wypowiedzi publicznych z XIX i XX wieku, wybranych w ramach strategii ilustracyjnej badań naukowych. Podkreśla się, że zasób wiadomości znajdujący się w szeregu takich agregatów wiedzy podlega pewnym prawom strukturyzacji, porządkowania, ćwiczenia i spektakularności, które autor zidentyfikował. Stwierdza się, że „publiczny list” (przemówienie publiczne) odgrywa ważną rolę w reprodukcji wspólnoty, zarówno jej pamięci/upamiętnienia (w pracach upamiętniania), jak i zbiorowego myślenia zgodnie z ideą L. Wittgensteina.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: wiedza, socjologia wiedzy, mowa społeczna, publiczna, agregacja wiedzy, media, konstrukcja medialna wiedzy, analiza tekstu.

Many researchers conceptualize modern society as a „knowledge society”, „society of communication”, „information society”, „galaxy of the Internet”².

¹ L. Vitgenshtejn, Filosofskie raboty, Moskwa 1994, p. 122.
However, the mechanisms of knowledge translation, the mechanisms of the non-reflexive aggregates, rooted in the evident transfer of knowledge, often remain outside the consideration of modern sociologists. And first of all, it concerns those structures of doxa\(^3\), which remain self-evident for the theorist himself, who is, according to the apt statement of Bourdieu, only a way of comprehension by the society of himself. P. Bourdieu says that such a theory is a place, where socially acceptable theses sound. These doxa structures manifest themselves only for the detached, objectifying researcher’s view – or for the view of „someone else’s” (according to A. Schütz\(^4\)), who „sees” a given culture horizon of the relevance as conflicting with the natural horizon for this „alien person”. Alienation and „Verfremdung” (according to B. Brecht and V. Shklovsky\(^5\)) within the framework of the „technique of alien” are not always available to the sociologist (although this is exactly what research methods of social anthropologists and ethnographers refer to\(^6\)), whereas „technique of detached view” requires a lot of effort and self-discipline. From this point of view, we find an interesting way of objectification and „alienation” in the form of the historicalization of research material, its borrowing of foreign cultural sources (a strategy that brings our strategy and anthropology closer together) and its subsequent structuralization.

The fact that this topic is often interpreted as „overly philosophical”, „lying beyond sociology” contributes to the actualization of this issue as well. Although, as pointed out by P. Bourdieu, there is nothing more sociological than poststructuralist and constructivist research of doxes objectified in language structures (R. Barthes, J. Derrida, J. Kristeva), „language games” and „life forms” (L. Wittgenstein).

That is why we have chosen the goal of our work to study public speech as a process of constituting, legitimizing, reifying and representing knowledge aggregates. Knowledge aggregates (basing on ideas given in\(^7\)) are defined as (functional) communicative and active way of saving time, which (ontologically) is in a certain way packaged and coherent set of judgments of experience. In this sense, knowledge aggregate can be analyzed as a mythological plot, an artwork, a picture, a public policy statement, a news story, a scientific concept, a religious construction, and so on. Knowledge aggregate contains at least two coherent


\(^5\) V. B. Shklovskij, Tetiva: O neskhodstve shkodnogo, Moskva 1970.


judgments, which must have a uniform „packaging” for them. In this regard, L. Wittgenstein writes that: „beginning to believe in something, we believe not a single phrase, but a whole system of phrases”\(^8\), and that is why it is not an individual acceptance, but a collective practice that reproduces and strengthens, argues and legitimizes the aggregated system of judgments. It is from this angle that knowledge appears to be a collective tool for marking up reality (right up to the „social setting”, according to E. Goffman\(^9\)), and the knowledge aggregate turns out to be functional as a way of communicative and activity „lubrication” for interaction, by means of which knowledge-based patterns of interaction are established, thereby saving time, interactions and efforts on the meta-interactive and meta-communicative levels. Therefore, public speech in the framework of this work is considered such an aggregate.

Because of the definition of knowledge aggregate, we aim to view public speech as the apparently existing amount of evidence, that is, on the one hand, studied by adopting a poststructural approach viewed as a system generated by hidden structures, and on the other hand, descriptively researched by scientists following Wittgenstein's demand: „We should abandon all explanations and replace it only with a description”\(^10\). It is this view that allows us to see everyday life as a system of generated and generating structures, in the words of P. Bourdieu\(^11\), where the linguistic games are the result. These games are not monopoly games, they are not the monopoly establishment of rules, but only one possible application of the word, action, sign – „one language game along with others, and not the general essence of language”\(^12\). We will build this analysis on the basis of the conceptual method of „family resemblances” created by L. Wittgenstein, who, metaphorizing the results of the study of family similarities, says that there is no monopoly possessor of all family features, there is no „thorough”, or „universal” indicator, yet their similarities remain obvious. That is why for L. Wittgenstein such „synthesizing” and „generalizing” view is more important and weighty than the analytic validity of the research and a holistic view of the grammar of our behaviour that presupposes, first of all, the study of linguistic practices. These practices provide people with the ability to „live in” social structures and situations, where people join in, fill them with unique meanings and particular „lives”.

It is at this angle that knowledge appears to be an implicit readiness to declare for some occasion: „I believe that...”, „I am ready to accept that...”, „I am not ready to debate with...”, „For me, it is permissible that...”. There is not only the

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12. L. Vitgenshtejn, Filosofskie..., op. cit.
fact of knowledge in these formulas but also the ways to verify and confirm knowledge – first of all by testing through practice, through the continuous application.

After all, such judgments simultaneously carry a rule in themselves, follow the rule and produce rules: judgment is nothing else than a) an observant application, b) recognition of consent (i.e. somebody is recognizing at the moment of his consent), c) understanding the regularity (i.e. something is becoming understandable to somebody thanks to the regularity of something).

The category of background appears to be insufficient here: this category objectifies rule at the level of factuality according to E. Durkheim, but also poststructuralism, which rejects the people’s community as the subject of reproduction of rules, structures and speech acts.

In this situation, we may look for help in poststructuralism. This paradigm, however, is significant in order to investigate not so much the process of knowledge-based production as the process of knowledge-based functioning (i.e. stable reproduction and regular iteration and repetition). Here Roland Barthes’s semiology, which allows us to investigate any meanings and senses (not only denotating but deliberately created in a communicative purposes), and overcome these meanings and senses (and systematic nature of language as an instrument and method of domination) in the process of „overcoming” through „explanation”14, seems to be salient. Roland Barthes demonstrates, that disassembling, de-engineering, deconstructing in order to debunk, denaturalize, desacralize – this is the only possible strategy for overcoming ideological „writing”, demonstrating its historical determinism.

Another important methodological refinement that we adopted from R. Barthes is the requirement to analyze not the „semiology of structure” but „the semiology of structuring”, to shift the emphasis from a static „sign” to the process of „signification”. Here, the metaphors such as „magma of meanings”, „pre-meanings”, „metallanguage” introduced by R. Barthes are in parallel with the ideas of J. Kristeva concerning „pheno-text” and „gene-text”15.

All this is superimposed on Barthes' inherently traced idea that language is not something that is created by man as absolutely new and just-now-invented but is more like a „place of hire” of discursive units, syntactic constructions, „genres of discourse”, etc. In this „place of hire”, we get already repeatedly used, „crumpled”, „dirty”, „stained”, „flavoured” and „painted” units, with (using the postmodern jargon) „prints” and „tracks” of contexts and texts. In this sense, the practice of using language, according to R. Barthes, is not independent of history and biography.

It is not surprising that R. Barthes comes to the conclusion that “writing” (as an ideological “grid” objectified in the language and placed by a social group or social institution between an individual and reality\textsuperscript{16}) is typologized as different “sociolects” that signify and fixate socioculturally existing representations (as the system of knowledge operands) and legitimately carry out violence over the ways of thinking, categorical series, the ability to “see” and that ability to “evaluate.”

Moreover, denotative signs continue to exist, but they prove to be only a deceptive, false “support”, a “bearer” of various signifiers, or “secondary signifiers”, inflexible, but no less effectively functioning. In other words, myths exist as a set of connotative signifiers, which in this case, form a latent (ideological) level of discourse. At the same time, R. Barthes defines ideology as widely as possible, – as L. Pinto could understand the doxa\textsuperscript{17}, and P. Bourdieu – “common sense”\textsuperscript{18}. That is why, according to R. Barthes, people do not use language, but language uses people. It is language that subordinates people to a scenario that is unknown and authoritative to them. One that may be referred to as an indirect, mediated scenario: language always plays a mediating role; it cannot „express” or „articulate” at all, it can only call, name, or nominate. And the development, semiotic power of the language unfolds against the language user: language is not just objectified, it is alienated and precedes the individual; language is independent of him; language offers individual, ready-made forms in which subjectivity is imprinted and sculpted.

That is why we consider the future public appearances and speeches primarily as a set of custom strategies for „visiting”, „celebrating”, „marking”, „checking-in” in the language „common places”. These „common places” can be micro-toposes of lexical order, meso-toposes of discourses, ideologems, mythologems, and maybe macro and mega-toposes of ideologies, mythologies, discourses, habitual schemes of thinking and „well-known” routes in language labyrinths.

The third important component in the methodology and the process of analyzing public speeches is provided by Jacques Derrida. He teaches us to abandon the central principle of the European philosophical, methodological and cultural consciousness – the principle of „centering”, as well as the dichotomized privilege\textsuperscript{19}. And it is not about „turning over” a dichotomy (for example, not to make „black” positively discriminated against „white”, and „female” against „male”), but it is about a complete destruction of the very idea of difference as an opposition. In the place of a difference, he offers differance, otherness, i.e. the simultaneous co-existence of a multitude of semantic instances, the co-existence that leaves „traces”, generates actions and meanings, generates oneself and the

\textsuperscript{16} R. Bart Izbrannye raboty..., op. cit.
\textsuperscript{17} L. Pento, Doksa intellektuala, „Socio-Logos”, 1996, pp. 32-38.
\textsuperscript{18} P. Bourdieu, Le Sens..., op. cit.
\textsuperscript{19} Zh. Derrida, Pismo i razlichie, Sankt-Peterburg 2000.
other. Only such a decentering allows us to see in any public text not the familiar, cosy, comfortable and inscribed in ourselves rules in advance, but the objectification of those which need a suspicious attitude towards them.

These structures, in the language of Julia Kristeva, are embodied in pheno-text as a packaged, ready, solid, structured semi-product with a clear and stable meaning, as well as with meaningful stability\textsuperscript{20}. It is the pheno-text of phrases and discourses, their intentionality and instrumentality, with their performativity in J. Austin’s language\textsuperscript{21}, that will be the empirical object of our research, but this only concerns empirical discourse analysis procedures, because the pheno-text exists only to hide the gene-text as a „second scene”, as a place of „differentiation” and as a place of unstructured semantic plurality, ordered only at the level of the pheno-text, in which it crystallizes and acquires practical and institutional form.

The kinds of pheno-texts, de-centrally considered by us as the connotative-denotative practice of „language games”, are public speeches that we view as already fabricated, massively accepted (or accepted in the process of fabrication) and legitimate knowledge aggregates. Any composition of knowledge (that is, the composition of judgments) produced in different subuniversums (contexts)\textsuperscript{22}, according to different rules and production procedures, differently formalized and oriented, can be considered aggregates. Texts of news (implying different manifestations, different ways of interpreting and enigmatic „decoding”), letters (as a way of reproducing the social according to „factory rules” and conveyors of a certain historical epoch and socio-cultural place), public productions of knowledge aggregates (for instance, public appearances and their texts), objects of advertising, semiotic subsystems and connections can be considered aggregates as well.

Such a plan is somewhat similar to the Foucauldian project (in particular, its idea of the archeology of knowledge\textsuperscript{23}), but if M. Foucault set himself with aim of exposing pathos primarily, the pathos of the archeological „dissection” of various forms and ways of knowledge phylogenesis and ontogenesis, then our goal is somewhat different. We, do not plan to carry out (for the most part) deep discourse analysis, as we do not use most of the content analysis works. We set ourselves the task of finding the conjugation of knowledge (represented, in one way or another, on the one hand, and communication, action, things and signs, on the other).

\textsuperscript{20} Yu. Krіsteva, Polilog, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{21} Dzh. L. Ostin, Izbrannoe, Moskva 1999.
\textsuperscript{22} W. James, The Perception of Reality, „Principles of Psychology”, 1905, New York, pp. 283-324.
\textsuperscript{23} M. Fuко, Arkheologiya znaniya, Sankt-Peterburg 2004.
The empirical basis of our research includes a number of texts presented in the following editions, used purely for the comparative purpose of our study:


As it can be seen, the sample we have formed is neither representative nor pretending to reach any research completeness. Our task, which must be emphasized, is the implementation of the „intelligence research” probing the possibility of objectifying culture and media texts and even texts not considered as such, not for traditional critical purposes, and not for the purpose of searching for „hidden” tendencies, manifestations of public opinion, etc., but to establish differences in different historical patterns of the social.

Our procedural restrictions are due to the fact that, in contrast to W. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, we did not work with the prototypes of speeches (audio or video recordings of those), which is why the technique of selecting units of observation is conditioned. Our choices are the following:

1) complete texts (since the texts presented in abbreviations and adaptations do not provide an opportunity to evaluate the systems of translation, communication, evaluation, etc.). It is the complete text, representing a full-fledged knowledge aggregate (that is, such a composition of knowledge fragments that is subject to an autonomous and finished act of perception), that allows us to assess the sufficient and necessary structures and modes of communication, interaction, sign and material exchange, in the language of C. Levi-Strauss.

2) citations that are sufficiently representative in knowledge optics – that is, they are quotations that allow us to represent a whole class or the phenomenon behind it. The initial sample set of quotations was much larger, but limitations of the genre (and absence of assurance regarding the achievement of representativeness and completeness) compelled us to confine the provided sample;

3) typical techniques and methods of fabricating the social. By these, we mean not only those met more often (in the investigated sample), but also those that have a „reflection”, a manifestation of and options for practising in the modern

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25 Of course, this applies to the very procedure of letter translating – like any other text of culture – into another language, but in an accessible arsenal of techniques and procedures it is rather difficult to resist this problem, so it must be taken into account.
world, which suggests the hypothesis not to be on their socio-cultural or historical universality, but the duration of their historical existence.

Among the genres of „public epistles” we have chosen, memoirs (as an intimate publication and mediatization of the past) and public speeches (as an intimate publication and mediatization of the present and the future). They both have their own genre and constitutively knowledge differences, but they are united by a number of specific features.

So, one of these specific features is the fabrication of the correlation and ratio of individuality and collectivity. This ratio is always leaving a place of collective dominance, which is manifested in the publication of such intimacy attributes as „honour”, „joy”, „inability to respond as should”, „I am not worthy,” that is best visible in the provided example coming from Ostrovsky

27: „Gentlemen! I thank you for the honour, that you honour me, and for the joy that you bring to me”. Such pragmatically dysfunctional speech turns are first of all functional socially, and in this case, negations are also fulfilling an affirming function, as in the example: „I would like to respond to your heartfelt greetings as it should be. God sees I want it, but I cannot”28.

In particular, collectivity is endowed with the capacity for factuality and determining the influence on individuality. Collectivity produces an individuality, it is postulated as influential and significant: „From now on, the very name of your city will, I'm sure, inspire in me a feeling of gratitude and joy. While I live, I will love its inhabitants, its hills, its houses, even the stones of its bridge”29; which determines its memoirs (knowledge-symbolic) practices as well as emotional aspects („It's sad, so sad, that Vera Fedorovna Panova is no longer with us”30).

Such an „effect” can be achieved not only through the essentialization, reification, naturalization, sacramentization and institutionalization of objective collectivity, but also through desacralization, „humiliation”, debunking and „weakening” of individuality, which is achieved primarily by speech methods („Gentlemen, I want to conclude my speech – I still have to bother you for the third time today – with a repetition of what I have already said”31), but primarily fulfills the social functions of identifying actors with some integrity and unity, establishing interoperability („Let me only mention the relationship of Ivan Ivanovich to Russian life and to the writers...”32).

It is with this goal that the fabrication of collectivity as an even more massive and meaningful action is carried out in a knowledgeable way. This fabrication, in

29 Ibidem, p. 455.
30 Memories of Vera Panova. Collection, Moscow 1988, p. 10.
31 C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 487.
32 A. N. Ostrovsky, Criticism..., op. cit., p. 82.
our observations, needs, in general, a special study, but a number of means can already be identified now.

So, one of them is the fabrication of an intensive jointness (including the past): „Our circle did not live much, but experienced a lot“\(^{33}\), which further allows actors to operate with collectiveness as some historically and biographically reasoned evidence. Opposite to it – in the case of the impossibility of such fabrication – is the fabrication of the possibility of intensive jointness (including future): „It seems to me that I am among old friends, whom I have long known and whom I appreciate a lot“\(^{34}\). From the point of view of W. Thomas's theorem, this tool is equivalent, but its use, since this tool does not rely on the substrate of the joint past (practices and things, signs and communications), has limited functionality.

Similar, but significantly different in terms of instrumental power and instruments involved, is the: fabrication of officially institutionalized collectivity: „Today, ladies and gentlemen, we celebrate the one hundred and twenty-second anniversary of the Royal Society of Musicians“\(^{35}\); that in a knowledgeable and communicative plan is identical to the production of the possibility of interaction and the establishment of some concrete Other (Instance) and generalized Third (Instance) through authority and sociodicy (according to P. Bourdieu\(^{36}\)) of activity of the Official Objective Reality.

An equally significant example is the production of collectivity on the basis of „unity of practices and the resulting knowledge aspects: I think we can have no doubt that we, having gathered here for the sake of children and in the name of children, have thus proved that they are not indifferent to us“\(^{37}\).

Such fabrication of collectivity is sufficiently stable insofar as it appeals to decisions (prior or actual) co-opted into the fabricated collective.

And orthogonal to the already mentioned means of collective fabrication is the fabrication of collectivity on the basis of an important coincidence (it can be a unity of one feature, unity against a background of many differences, which are even purposefully emphasized or argued): „I regret that I am not your age mate and that I will not see what you will see, a new humanity. But I know that it will come“\(^{38}\).

\(^{33}\) Ibidem, p. 80.
\(^{34}\) C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 453.
\(^{35}\) Ibidem, p. 513.
\(^{36}\) P. Burdie, Socialnoe prostranstvo: polya i praktiki, Moskva 2005.
\(^{37}\) C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 501.
Moreover, the importance of coincidence is not simply determined by all participants more or less arbitrarily, but is also constructed in knowledge by attributing emotions, sensations, feelings, opinions of some „objectivity“:

„But I am happy to think that from now all of you are inextricably linked with this day; and that whenever it comes I will in my imagination see you again and again…; in gratitude for the happiness that you gave me today”\(^{39}\).

Often, this is done by employing the previous technique – namely, the correlation of collectivity and individuality, and with the „sacrifice” of an individuality, which, quite in the style of the number of concepts of gift\(^{40}\), is very homologous to some sacrifice that is the basis of the community that is being built.

Thus, an example of this sacrifice is the voluntary (self)objectification of the subject who, for the purpose of fabricating collectivity, gambits his or her subjectivity, his or her opinion (or at least declares it):

„I was asked to offer a toast – or, in the words of my friend Mr Owen, take on the role of walking advertising and praise you the educational institutions of Birmingham, which I am ready to do with great joy”\(^{41}\).

As a variation of this fabrication, the following instrumentalization of fabrication can also be considered (with which, incidentally, we do not agree):

„the fabrication of collectivity based on the coincidence of emotions or perceptions, judgments or (re)cognizings: „Up to the snowy road to the cemetery in Komarovo, according to which people are still going now. Those are going who happened to know Vera Fedorovna personally, and those for whom Panova” – author of their favourite novels, stories, plays and scripts. So, the lessons of Vera Fedorovna are not over”\(^{42}\).

Another characteristic of the public epistle that we propose is especially important for us because it reveals the confirmation of our hypothesis about knowledge protocols, their existence and structure. So, we observe the installation of the protocol of publicity with knowledge means. This installation is achieved both at the expense of a template (for the protocol of publicity „constants”) turnovers, speech or knowledge instruments, practices („Dear comrades, send you your fraternal greetings”)\(^{13}\), and by distancing speaker from the object or from the subject of the hearing – and the protocol of publicity, in fact, inevitably assumes a specific distance – if we consider the protocol of publicity as the result of (self) description of the public („Mr Chairman,

\(^{39}\) C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 460.

\(^{40}\) M. Enaff, Dar filosofov. Pereosmyslenie vzaimnosti, Moskva 2015.

\(^{41}\) C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 488.

\(^{42}\) Memories of Vera Panova, Collection, Moscow, 1988, p. 446.

\(^{13}\) R. Rolland, Collected..., op. cit., p. 452.
gentlemen, I do not know, I just do not know how to thank you")\textsuperscript{44}.

This production of distances can build distance not only for the speaker or the listener – it can also distance some “concrete Third”: “It is hardly possible for a comparatively young reader to share with us, the older ones, the first perception of the Satellites”\textsuperscript{45}. It produces special opportunities for the distribution of hierarchies, concentric and universally meaningful circles for inequality, officially and publicly fixed and reproduced.

Another way to install a publicity protocol is to produce a “complete description” as a procedure for explicating the implicit, manifestation of the unobvious and technological nature of the a purely social: “Gracious sirs! We are here to greet the veteran of Russian literature, Ivan Ivanovich Lazhechnikov, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of his authorial activity”\textsuperscript{46}.

At the same time, the protocol of publicity often assumes a kind of algorithmization of the action, which makes the activity transparent to all its participants, transparent to a multitude of people, which both simplifies mass communication (and joint action) and installs the generalized Third (Instance): “To say that I thank you for the hot support for the toast, eloquently proposed ... – it’s still half the battle”\textsuperscript{47}. What is significant here is that such technological tasks are hidden behind completely non-technological tools, such as metaphors, hyperbolas, metonymies (“much of gratitude” that “grows around” the speaker)\textsuperscript{48}, the use of complex literary and mythological techniques (for example, the mention of Argus who: “would feel that weekly public receptions diminished his power and dulled his vigilance”\textsuperscript{49}), and the use of the art techniques for “closure” of text in practice:

“You lifted me to such a peak of joy that I really found myself in that woeful situation, which I jokingly described, starting my speech”\textsuperscript{50}; “The Birmingham Polytechnic School is now experiencing a time of infancy, and it, like every baby, was surrounded by many troubles and misfortunes”\textsuperscript{51}.

However, this paradox is apparent. In fact, these methods are nothing more than an appeal to conventional, pre-agreed, universal (or particularly universal) knowledge aggregates (mythologems, habitual images, historical realities, literary images) that describe, in a universal and unproblematic way, joint reality.

That is why an important place in any public epistle is the production of communicative foundations. If in an intimate epistle this production is important

\textsuperscript{44} C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 461.
\textsuperscript{45} V. Panova, op. cit., p. 319.
\textsuperscript{46} A. N. Ostrovsky, Criticism..., op. cit., p. 82.
\textsuperscript{47} C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 456.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibidem, p. 462.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibidem, p. 472.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibidem, p. 474.
primarily for the official or distanced production of the epistle, then in the public epistle this production is the foundation for further communication. It can be many-sided:

- for example, it can camouflage itself as an explication of some implied community of views or beliefs, practices or knowledge: „We are unanimous in condemning the current teaching system”52;
- it can be implemented as a logical argument for the right to speak:

„Twenty-five years ago, television instructed me to make a forty-minute show about the work of Vera Fedorovna Panova. As a child, I read all that came across ... Panov's „Satellites” were also read by chance, the book became a beloved for life, not only for its undoubted merits (as I now understand) but also for my emotional feedback”53.

- it can be carried out as the openness and sincerity of the speaker, thereby producing the speaker within the framework of Thomas’s theorem: „Gentlemen, I try never to forget about it, and so it is not difficult for me to determine where your kindness and hospitality come from”54;
- the basis of communication can paradoxically be a demonstrative non-presence in this communication of some „alienated” actor, who is aware of his or her detachment and officially reproduces his or her detachment:

„The society in which I have the pleasure of being present at this moment has long been close to me. Allow me, ladies and gentlemen, to wish your society success in achieving the goals which for it was founded, and in implementing those intentions that animated us, its founders, and most importantly, let me wish that your Society in its further existence would not meet more obstacles achieving their lofty goals and in performance of their noble intentions”55.

- an important tool for constructing the basis of communication is, as we know from the official public speeches of politicians, a knowledge „connection” of the speaker to irrelevant factors such as history, collectivity, and practices. Thus, C. Dickens56, in one of his speeches, tells about the history and statistics of the school which as he claims, he knows better than the pupils and workers.

Of course, the tools and methods of fabricating the basis of communication can be combined – for example, official (self)distancing can be combined with familiarizing themselves with the „having the right to the word” community, linking their actions with the close past and with more extensive chronotopic strata:

„In my opinion, this honor, so unanimously rendered in such a meeting – let it be allowed to develop the idea of a venerable archdeacon, whose spoken here speech gave me an unforgettable pleasure, I repeat, gentlemen, in my opinion, such an honor serves as a double

52 R. Rolland, Publicism, op. cit., p. 106.
54 C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 458.
55 A. N. Ostrovsky, Criticism..., op. cit., p. 133.
56 C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 468.
illustration of the position that literature occupies in our, of course, „depraved“ age⁵⁷.

In the fabrication of the social in general, and the order (the order of interaction, communication, things, signs) in particular, the important role is played by reliance on the „obedience“. And this reliance on the obscure, doxical, public assumes the look of sociodicy: thus, defending copyright, Charles Dickens writes:

„Scott might not have bent under the weight of excessive mental strain, and lived longer and added new creatures of his imagination ... When I listened to these words, a touching scene from the life of this great man arose quickly before my inner gaze ...“⁵⁸.

Sociodicy also extends to the justification of hierarchies, both as hierarchies of the autonomous field (in the language of P. Bourdieu) and hierarchies of heteronomy:

„Let it is suffice to say that at this time writers such as Vera Panova, Vissarion Sayanov, Mikhail Zoshchenko, Alexander Prokofiev, Vera Ketlinskaya, Yevgeny Shvarts worked in Leningrad – I call only those with whom I had to communicate personally. There were young, hopeful writers, Daniil Granin, Mikhail Dudin, Sergei Orlov, Anatoly Chepurov, and Fedor Abramov lectured us on the history of Soviet literature at the university“⁵⁹.

These doxical generalities often legitimize group interests with the help of the rhetoric of naturalness, universalizing the particular and depriving the conventional of conditional:

„For France is interested in knowing the truth. It is interested in not hiding her mistakes and her sins. She is interested in knowing the abuses of power that discredit her good name“⁶⁰,

„Even those who seem not to share my opinion, in effect, look at the danger of ignorance and the advantages of knowledge in approximately the same way“⁶¹.

At the same time, the authors operate on social constructs with the highest degree of abstraction („France“, „truth“, „mistakes“, „sins“, „abuse“, „good name“, „knowledge“, „ignorance“), which are sacrificed and re-classified, reified and naturalized as real, existing, included in a set of „obsolete“, doxic reliance on which it occurs; and the proportions, correlations and the interrelationships between these concepts („the danger of ignorance“, „the advantages of knowledge“) enter into unconditioned and unconditional categorical and categoric connections.

⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 485.
⁵⁹ V. Panova, op. cit., p. 245.
⁶⁰ R. Rolland, Publicism, op. cit., p. 130.
⁶¹ C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 477.
An alternative to this is the reliance on commonly-known and doxical problems and negatives that are opposed to the community, that, oddly enough, does not reduce the likelihood and possibility of interaction (and, consequently, social in the broad sense of the word), but, quite on the contrary, raises it: „Our works, under conditions, as you know, are not always favourable, do not particularly contribute to the cheerful mood of the spirit in a person”62.

Another way of reliance on self-evidence is to refer to the generally accepted practices, routine actions and everyday habits: „All of us, often attending the theatre, have learned, I do not doubt, to predict by various small signs how events unfold on the stage”63. They are opposed to no less self-evident – not in terms of ontology, but in terms of deontology – slogans and values such as: „Concordia res parvae crescent! Viribus unitis!”64 These mottoes are worth the gold on which they were minted!”65:

„And let me, dear ladies, tell you how clever it was on your part to turn your favored attention to this institution, for where the light of knowledge spreads, where it is most clearly understood that there is beauty and good and how it is possible to atone for human vices and misconceptions, you will be best able to appreciate your character, your virtues, your charisma, your highest dignity, and there you will be proudly paid a tribute of devotion and respect”66.

In this sense, we find that the self-evident becomes a foundation of the social and ontological (that is, the actual assumption about the real existence of something as a reality), and deontologically (that is, as a hypothetical or protocally determined judgment of the necessary and (or) needed).

An important factor in the sustainable functioning of the social, on the one hand, and in the order of using knowledge in it, on the other hand, is the productivity and effectiveness of the fabrication of naturalness and sincerity. This fabrication paradoxically implies a comparison-without-comparison, which implies some experience beyond the limits of the social and its order, but it is „ignored”, „not seen”, its value and importance are underestimated, and the social order itself is opposed to all other orders:

„That’s why, gentlemen, I say today, – I say with all my heart, honest intentions and grateful feelings – that no words can convey how deeply your memory, your friendly and honorable reception crashed deep into my memory, that nowhere under the sky of Europe, nor anywhere in what cozy and warm house I cannot forget your country...”67.

Another paradox of sincerity in its social dimension is the emphasis and accent on those aspects and determinants of communication or interaction that, by their

62 A. N. Ostrovsky, Criticism..., p. 132.
63 C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 508.
64 Consent magnifies small also! With common efforts!
65 A. N. Ostrovsky, Criticism..., p. 133.
66 C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 471.
67 Ibidem, p. 462.
very design or essence, are opposed to the very chance of sincerity: „I have maintained my loyalty and devotion to it (the revolution – A.G.) despite some or other ideological differences, about which I expressed with sincerity”\(^{68}\).

The third paradox that sincerity suggests to us is the publication of an intimate and intimisation of the public:

„I did not study at the Literary Institute, because, contrary to generally accepted standards, I did not dream of becoming a writer from childhood. It seemed so unattainable to me that even after the publication of my first books I was somewhat surprised that I wrote and was even praised in the critical reviews”\(^{69}\).

It is precisely because of this that sincerity in its fabrication presupposes a rather powerful foundation of emotional actions (or those that look like such or are practised as such), decisions, communications:

„Gentlemen, believe that I accept this tray and this ring as gifts precious to me, but in themselves so valuable as samples of skilful masterpieces of this city – with great excitement and a feeling of lively gratitude”\(^{70}\).

The reverse side of this fabrication is the published distancing of oneself, a demonstrative communicative (but not active) „alienation” from collectivity, which transforms the speaker into an equal one to the listener (that is ontologically unequal positions, but socially equates with this „alienation”), and transposes speech from broadcasting in intercommunication: „Gentlemen, I am proud that on the stage I had and have the best, most devoted friends”\(^{71}\). This self-alienation from collectivity, communicative, but not activity-based, distanced opposition presupposes, in particular, a specific operation with the meanings of high and low, sacred and damned, personal and public, private and public, deontology and ontology, the past and the future:

„...My first desire would be to discard all personal considerations and think only of the high purpose and purpose of this crowded meeting, of the noble tasks of this institution, of its glorious, inspirational history, steep and difficult path, so bravely they travelled”\(^{72}\).

In this practice of distancing, one of the poles of the above dichotomies – namely, responsibility for the production of consistency, solidarity, unity – takes precedence:

„On the high mountain above Tiflis flaunts the great grave of the great Griboedov, and so high above us, all is his genius. Not we, the writers of modern times, but he brought a living stream of truth in life to the Russian drama literature”\(^{73}\).

\(^{68}\) R. Rolland, *Publicism*, op. cit., p. 130.
\(^{69}\) V. Panova, op. cit., p. 244.
\(^{70}\) C. Dickens, *Articles…*, op. cit., p. 484.
\(^{71}\) A. N. Ostrovsky, *Criticism…*, p. 135.
\(^{72}\) C. Dickens, *Articles…*, op. cit., p. 467.
\(^{73}\) A. N. Ostrovsky, *Criticism…*, p. 253.
Priority is given to the past before the present, the sacred before the secular, the public before the intimate, the public before the individual, the universal before the collective, the duties before the rights, the determination before the liberties:

„Gentlemen, the duties of the Trustee of the Theater Fund, which post I have the honour to perform, are not as numerous as its rights. In other words, it is no more than a character without words, with the only regrettable difference that it has no one to sign for”74.

- as well as the objective before the subjective, the mass before the individual, the structure before the action, the object of speaking before the subject of speaking: „The „Satellites” story entered into my life with the Vera Panova’s name, significant not only in itself, but also by the way it sounded”75.

One of the most powerful and involved techniques of producing the social as a situation of possible interaction and a conditional (that is, it needs of activity) order is the production of the uniqueness of the situation. A good and strong tool for producing uniqueness is by using unique things, realized or not realized as such:

„Thirty years ago, an unsent letter. Thankful, not fit in big notebook. And it turned out, to this day disturbing. There is no point in it. Mentally I get to the line of relations with Vera Fedorovna – to a dispute that broke off at the end of the sixties. To a dispute, I thought, also forgotten, but surfaced in memory and presented in a new light. Just like books, like the whole face of Vera Panova”76.

Uniqueness is always associated with such categories as „special”, „particular”, „specific”, „unique”, „the only”, „unbelievable”, „indescribable”, which should reflect the attitude of participants in a situation not so much to the situation itself, as to the interaction in it, and the attitude of situation to participants – as a priority as mentioned above and here:

„I also have a special reason to rejoice on this meeting, and this is what the reason is: I am pleased that the resolutions that will be proposed here, do not contain any sectarian or class clauses, that they relate not to any one institution, but express the great unshakable principles of the widest dissemination of knowledge everywhere and under all circumstances”77.

A powerful tool for designing uniqueness are reproducible social conventions, like „round numbers”, „anniversary dates”, „unique days”, „social holidays”, „religious celebrations” and so on. Moreover, the conditional nature of this instrument becomes especially visible either from outside the specific community or after a long time: „Friends, together with you, I mark the tenth anniversary of

74 C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 509.
75 V. Panova, op. cit., p. 226.
76 Ibidem, p. 319.
77 C. Dickens, Articles..., op. cit., p. 475.
the end of the war” [78]. The instrument of conditionality in the production of the situation uniqueness can be even the (f)act of acquaintance of communicants, the (f)act of constituting social situation and establishing social order: „I’ve heard already that the Georgians have a good troupe, and today I convinced that you play really well” [79]. A necessary and indispensable attribute of this production is respected as a social arrangement, hierarchization and distancing of the participants in relation to one other and to the situation, to collectivity and to the social order: „So let me briefly tell you why I have special sympathy and respect for the Royal society of musicians” [80].

The production of the social and its order is impossible without memory, which not only preserves, but also legitimizes, and even paradoxically conceals processes of preserving and legitimizing social and social order. In this sense, the methods of memorialization and memoriality are extremely revealing: they, on the one hand, select the object of memorization, on the other hand, select the objects of forgetting [81]. Naturally, from the text genres we have analyzed, memoirs turned out to be the most saturated by practices of memorialization and artefacts of memorials, although public epistles contain a considerable number of objectified and formalized practices of memorialization as a way of establishing the natural order of the social.

For instance, it is the memorialization that is carried out in the genetic „analysis” of the situation (in fact -(re)making the genesis): „I saw Vera Panova only in 1946, already in the halo of the author of the „Satellites”” [82]. In this way, the (re)production of communication bases, the (re)production of unity (see above) and collectivity are done. At the same time, any (or at least minimal) participation of the speaker (carrying out a public or intimate epistle) is important in the retrojected [83] genesis of the situation:

„And it was immediately recalled how persistently she taught on the base „Lenin’s grandchildren” our children’s, our future correspondents, to comprehend the secret of words. And she herself masterfully mastered all the shades of speech” [84]

At the same time, a technically strong social technique is demonstration of the unity of the speaker’s everyday life with the structural features of a memorialized phenomenon or a community, which is grounded in memorialization:

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[80] C. Dickens, Articles…, op. cit., p. 514.
[81] On the example of formalized objectifications, we analyzed this in (Slobodyanyuk A. G., Golikov O. S., Politiki amnezi: propozicii do konceptualizacii ta potenciya evristiki, „Sociologiya v situacii socialnikh neviznachenostej”, Kharkov 2009, p. 430).
[83] Analogically to projected.
[84] V. Panova, 1988, p. 186
“I remember the day when I first came to Vera Fedorovna Panova’s house on the Mars Field. Leningradians are well acquainted with the architectural ensemble, decorating with its magnificent facade the most spacious square of the city”\textsuperscript{85}.

Finally, the most important aspect of the constitution of structural aspects of the social (for example, the relevant structure of a protocol) is the \textit{structuring of (pheno-)}text. These practices, that look as purely textual or grammatical, are in fact purely social. Especially social are “breaks” in the texts, visually „inadvertent” transitions to other topics, announcements and „spoilers”- for example: „Ladies and gentlemen, everything I want to say today will fit into two very short remarks”\textsuperscript{86}. At the same time, all practices for structuring the text as a communication and interaction can be conditionally divided into the explicit ones (an example of which we have already mentioned above) and the implicit ones, naturally, with the dominance of the latter, which proves the thesis that has already been put forward on the purely social nature of grammatical texturing techniques of text structuring. Explicitness manifests itself both in the framing of text and in its internal differentiation: „I turn to the third objection, which, as much as I could mark, is expressed mainly by young people from good families...”\textsuperscript{87}.

The implicit techniques of structuring include the use of traditional methods of finalizing interaction in the protocol of officiality – for example, „official resolution” or „toast”: „Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to offer a resolution I have already read (Applause)”\textsuperscript{88}; and moreover: „Gentlemen, I propose a toast to the health of those members who have not left the Circle since its inception”\textsuperscript{89}. These fragments finished the public epistles of Charles Dickens and Alexander Ostrovsky, and they are very revealing.

Finally, another implicit framing-type technique for structuring are purely autonomous (i.e., specific to a given space or community) \textit{acts of finalizing communication and interaction} – that is communicating about communication, namely, its completion:

„On behalf of the literature to which you today have saluted, I thank you sincerely, and on my own behalf, I thank you separately for the flattering reception you rendered to a man whose merit consists only in the fact that he had chosen literature as his profession”\textsuperscript{90}.

Thus, public speeches as knowledge aggregates contain both practical techniques of constituting the social, which is especially vividly and visibly manifested in case of texts of speech, chronologically and culturally distanced

\textsuperscript{85} Ibidem, p. 256.  
\textsuperscript{86} C. Dickens, Articles…, op. cit., p. 480.  
\textsuperscript{87} Ibidem, p. 497.  
\textsuperscript{88} Ibidem, p. 482.  
\textsuperscript{89} A. N. Ostrovsky, Criticism…, p. 81.  
\textsuperscript{90} Ibidem, p. 487.
from the researcher (which we demonstrated on the example of the public epistles from the 19th century while employing a the decentring concept of J. Derrida). Ad these knowledge aggregates can be analyzed from both internal and external positions, i.e. they can be read both as pheno-texts and as a gene-texts (according to J. Kristeva). In the second case, we find its fullness with the connotative contents and meanings, predominant in a given society (according to R. Barthes), and the public speech itself, in this case, can be read as a „language game”, carried out not only by certain rules, but also with the purpose of reproducing and strengthening these rules. These seemingly fairly theoretical generalizations in the empirical detection of the conjugation of a sign, practices, things and knowledge demonstrate to us how complex the fabric of the social is in its fabrication, and how important is the role of media in fabricating this fabric.

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Public Speech as a Knowledge Aggregate – Possibilities of Research

Summary

The article analyses public speech as an aggregate or unit of knowledge and explores the possibilities of researching it as a media product. Using the methodology of the so-called „linguistic turn“ theorists (L. Wittgenstein, R. Barthes, J. Derrida, J. Kristeva) and researchers of the sociology of knowledge (P. Berger, T. Luckmann, K. Knorr-Cetina, M. Foucault, E. Goffman), the author proves that the media representation of knowledge structures in public speech is a real and actual social fact and that knowledge aggregates produced in it have their own structural and practical specifics. The article presents the author’s analysis of public speeches produced by a number of nineteenth- and twenty-century figures, selected in the framework of illustrative research strategy. It is emphasized that the knowledge located in the array of such knowledge aggregates is subjected to certain laws of its structuring, ordering, practising and spectacularity that the author has identified. It is concluded that the „public epistle“ (public speech) not only plays an important role in the community’s reproduction both of its memory/commemoration (in the practices of memorialization) but also in its collectively realized (according to L. Wittgenstein) thinking.

Keywords: knowledge, sociology of knowledge, social, public speech, knowledge aggregate, media, media construction of knowledge, text analysis.